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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

William F. Donnelly
Deputy Director for Administration

EXTENSION

NO.

ER/2088-86

DATE

8 May 1986

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Executive Director VJ
7D55 Hqs Bldg.

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Jim:

Attached are two brief papers pertaining to the changes in the SIG(I) structure. One deals with chairmanships, the other states concerns.

The point that seems to cry out for clarification is the SIG(I)-NTISSC relationship. (I am told that State has this concern as well.) NTISSC, where I represent the Agency and IC Staff is an observer, has a national shoulder. At least 24 organizations are represented at the table. Many of them such as GSA and the Department of Commerce are outside the Intel/DoD community. Don Latham chairs the NTISSC.

Do we really mean for SIG(I) to be a truly national organization??

I have sent a copy of this material to Bob Gates and Al Burkhalter.


William F. Donnelly

Attachments

DCI
EXEC
REG

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CHAIRMANSHIP OF NEW SIG(I) COMMITTEES

°We believe it important to retain chairmanship of the three SIG(I) committees which we chaired under SECOM.

-Personnel Security Committee

-Technical Security Committee

-R&D Committee

°Personnel Security Committee

-The Personnel Security Committee supplants SECOM's Personnel Security Subcommittee and the Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee.

-The Personnel Security Subcommittee of SECOM is now chaired by [] Chief, Clearance Division, CIA/OS.

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-The Security Awareness Subcommittee of SECOM is presently chaired by Army. (Allegedly, the chairman is weak).

-We believe that CIA should chair the new SIG(I) committee

--CIA has perhaps the broadest scope of personnel security activity and experience in investigations and adjudication.

--It has an understanding of personnel security issues; relating to both SCI and collateral information.

--It has a vital and active security awareness program.

°Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

-This committee would supplant the present Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee of SECOM.

-We recommend that the chair stay in CIA because the DCI has Executive Agent responsibility for TSCM and because we probably have the greatest expertise.

-The SECOM/TSCS is now chaired by [] Chief of our Technical Security Group in OS.

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--It is one of the more active SECOM committees and has been the primary community vehicle for exchange in TSCM.

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--It has several active sub-elements

-Technical Countermeasures Working Group

-Interagency Training Center Panel

-Survey Panel

-Technical Advisory Group

-Telephone Security Panel

-The TSCS is not in need of major overhaul, but we might consider raising the level of chairmanship and membership.

°R&D Committee

-The R&D Committee supplants the SECOM R&D Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on the Future.

-The R&D Subcommittee of SECOM is chaired by Phil Eckman, Director of ORD.

--It meets regularly, but is not a very dynamic organization.

--It is mainly an information exchange forum and has not been very active at community R&D planning.

--It has sponsored a few key programs with "seed" money. Some have borne fruit.

--It has sponsored a number of "threat" studies.

--It has an Armor and Protective Systems working group which has done some useful evaluations. It has an annual "spring rite" to conduct tests.

-The Subcommittee on the Future was proposed by Maynard Anderson, DoD/Policy.

--An NSA chairman has been selected but the subcommittee has never met.

--Its job is to think deeply about future security needs.

--It may or may not be a good mix with R&D.

-We believe that CIA should continue to Chair the R&D Committee

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--We have strong expertise in TSCM and several other areas.

--If NTISSC is not included in the SIG(I), R&D issues in COMSEC, TEMPEST, and computer security will be decided outside the SIG(I).

-We suggest that the chair be shifted to OS vice ORD.

--We are building a new D&E organization and will be responsible for overall security RDT&E planning. ORD's part is important but small.

°Placement of the Security Advisory Group (USSR)

-The proposed plan for SIG(I) places the SAG (USSR) under the IG/CM(P)'s Physical Security Committee.

-The SAG (USSR) is the group overseeing the

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-The SAG (USSR)'s work is technical--it belongs under the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee.

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CHANGES IN SIG(I) STRUCTURE

--Office of Security Views--

°CREATING NEW STRUCTURE/ABOLISHING SECOM

-As proposed, the SIG(I) is an action-oriented body which will deal with national-level CI and CM issues.

-This is a vitally important activity which has been needed for many years.

-Nevertheless, we are left with uncertainty as to the scope of the new SIG(I)'s responsibility.

--Is it an interdepartmental forum for policy and action in CI and CM?

--Or, is its scope limited to intelligence community concerns.

-We would hope that the intent is to make the SIG(I) the primary body for interdepartmental policy and action in CI and CM.

--Due to the decentralized nature of CI and CM activities in the US Government, this seems the only way to resolve complex, interdepartmental and interdisciplinary issues.

-If the new SIG(I) does have interdepartmental responsibilities, we may find that the DCI will still have need for some vehicle for CI/CM policy, coordination, and action within the intelligence community.

--The DCI retains a special, national responsibility for protection of sources and methods.

--He may wish to resolve certain issues within the community, independent of the national organization.

--The DCI may also wish to develop intelligence community positions for presentation in the national forum.

--As an example, the Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff, DO expressed his concern to us over the loss of a forum regularly used to resolve issues of handling of sensitive DO information.

S E C R E T

° LINES OF AUTHORITY

-Much of the concern about the proposed structure stems from lines of authority.

-DoD is dominant in the structure.

-Elements of SECOM which had reasonably direct lines to the DCI will now report through the layers of that structure. *no*

-Some of the concerns might be allayed if CIA were to chair one of the IG's. A case can be made for chairmanship of either the IG/CM(P) or the IG/CM(T). The DDA would seem to be the best candidate for chairman.

° NTISSC

-Adding to our concern over the scope of the new SIG(I) and DoD control, particularly in the technical area, is the fact that NTISSC has not been absorbed in the new structure.

-It does not seem that the SIG(I) can have an all-encompassing national charter in CI/CM when NTISSC operates outside its purview. *it don't*

-It is unclear how the proposed "Technical Countermeasures Committee" and NTISSC will relate.

-It would seem most appropriate to have the Technical Countermeasures Committee supplant NTISSC.

-This would have strong advantage on the technical side. SECOM and NTISSC would be made part of the same organization.

° SIG(I) AUTHORITY

-There is some concern that the SIG(I), created by this administration's NSDD-2, may not have the staying-power of a committee created by other means.

-There is concern that the organization we create could be abolished in the transition to a new administration.

-Other charter options to establish the long-term viability of the organization may be appropriate.

S E C R E T

°DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN IG/CM(P) AND IG/CM(T)

-Division of responsibilities between the IG/CM(P) and IG/CM(T) will be difficult.

-Some, including General Stilwell, we believe feel that the IG/CM cannot be split at all.

-Others, including ourselves, believe that the split may be workable, but that great care will have to be taken in defining charters.

-For instance:

--Where does information security and computer security begin?

Who worries about technological dimensions of physical security? (e.g. as now handled by the SECOM R&D subcommittee).

-A different alignment of committees ultimately may be appropriate.

°R&D

-The proposed R&D structure could also lead to confusion and duplication of effort.

-An R&D Committee is created under the IG/CM(T).

-But, it is stated that each committee will also have an R&D Subcommittee.

-The relationship between the R&D Committee and the Subcommittees needs to be clarified.

-Perhaps the Committee could serve as the central organization, drawing inputs from the subcommittees.

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